

Introduction – Transformations of Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe Twenty Years after the Breakdown of Communism

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1. The Transformation of Religion and Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe

Twenty years after the breakdown of communism, the status of religiosity and religion in Central and Eastern Europe remains indeterminate. A large body of empirical work indicates a revitalization of religion (Tomka et. al. 1999, 2008, 2010). However, a comparable number of empirical publications points out that secularization similar to that in the Western world is now taking place or will take place in the near future (Halman/Draulans 2006; Pickel 2009, 2010, 2011; Pollack 2001, 2009). It appears to be common sense that religiosity is undergoing a period of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it is uncertain what the transformation entails. Will previous religions recur with renewed strength, will others – alternative religions or religious movements – take their place (as per the market theory of religiosity), will a kind of spirituality that exceeds organized religion spread (as per the individualization theory of religiosity, see Luckmann 1967) or do many of the processes of ousting the religious in times of socialism merely represent early processes of secularization? Are the Eastern European states turning into the Western course of secularization or are they following a special path of their own?

These contradictory prognosis alone show that there is still need for further empirical research on the topic of religion and religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe. Especially comparative research that provides sound indications of possible trends is still rudimentary (see Pickel/Müller 2009). Of course, available time series data partly cover too short a time period to be able to discern trends in their entirety. In addition, we need to keep in mind that Central and Eastern Europe is by no means a homogeneous region even though the countries share a common Communist background. Nevertheless, these facts do not release research in the field of sociology of religion from transcending assumptions and searching for empirical evidence for the various theoretical propositions.

However, this is not the only challenge. More differentiated case studies (particularly those that consider special cases, speaking in the terms of comparative analysis) that refer to the main approaches in the sociology of religion are lacking as well. Why is there an increase in church membership in Russia, Romania and Bulgaria, while at the same time, the number of members in the Czech Republic and East Germany is stable (or declining)? Why is there such an increase in membership numbers but no increase in religious activities, like church attendance in many of the “revival countries” (such as Russia or the Ukraine)? Does the incredibly high level of religious vitality in Poland generally forbid us to speak of secularization in this instance?

Consequently, it is sensible to distinguish between *secularity* (see Wohlrab-Sahr/Karstein/Schmidt-Lux 2009), i.e. a state of low religiosity, and *secularization*, i.e. a process of decreasing religiosity. Processes of secularization may occur both in countries with high (Poland) as well as in countries with low religiosity (East Germany). Secularity is the state of a country, where religiosity has nearby no social relevance or significance (Wilson 1982). Here the distinction between different levels of secularity have to be considered. Dobbelaere (2002) distinguishes secularization at the level of the organisations, the society and the individuals. Casanova point out secularization as process of the separation of church and state, privatization and the erosion of religious beliefs in the population. Therefore a state can be seen as secular, if a strong church-state-separation is established, or, if all three levels of secularity is reached.

Beyond the analysis of the development of religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe, questions concerning the causes as well as the consequences of these processes for the religious realm arise. This pertains to the organizational, societal as well as to the individual sphere. Does nationalism go hand in hand with religion and does it lead to an increase in religious vitality, as in the case of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? Can we trace processes of cultural defense (Bruce 2002)? Does the relationship between politics and religion have an impact on the return of the religious – and what kind of consequences do we find in the different countries? Do religious developments have effects on politics and democracy? In how far do family values and religion correspond in Central and Eastern Europe? All in all, there are many questions which should be analyzed empirically.

In this book, we present a number of results that address the processes of *transformation of religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe* from different viewpoints.¹ We aimed to include not only articles that draw on different theoretical approaches from the field of sociology of religion but also articles that cover different aspects of the correspondence between the development of religion and other developments in society. Some articles address the correspondence between nationality and religion, others analyze the interrelation of politics and religion. A third group of papers concentrates on special issues concerning the development of religiosity. We hope that the results presented in this book provide a more concrete picture of the state of religion and religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe today and will enable researchers who are interested in this field to develop ideas to enhance the theoretical and empirical progress in this sector.

¹ For comparative purposes, some articles also include Western European countries.

The Religious Factor in Eastern Europe – Theoretical Considerations on Emergent Forms of Secularized Religion

Friedrich Fürstenberg

1. Introduction

Sociological investigations into the presence of the “religious factor” in post-communist societies are prone to numerous misconceptions and confusions. This becomes obvious particularly when data and their interpretation are compared both explicitly and implicitly against the background of experiences in Western Europe. The social transformations after the collapse of the Soviet orbit and in the course of German re-unification present striking examples. Depending on the point of view, attempts at argumentative data interpretation are linked with home-based patterns of thinking which are only partially suitable to comprehend structural changes. Searching for their object, sociologists of religion may fail to consider the prerequisites of its manifestations. Thus, comparisons of the intensity of church adherence and religious orientation are made even though they actually need an abstract, trans-culturally valid measure. Instead, we find either dogmatic definitions or strictly formal data modeling. Though they may be adequately evaluated quantitatively, when related to Eastern Europe, they often do not meet the standards of data collection and “qualitative embeddedness”.

2. Orientation Frames for Perceiving Religious Phenomena

Religious phenomena related to Eastern Europe are perceived and interpreted according to specific guidelines. These may in fact suffer from a socio-cultural bias. In Western Germany, a commonly accepted distinction between religion, based upon an institutionalized community of faith, and religiosity as a private search for affirmation of existential meaning has emerged. Observed tendencies in the development of this pattern also served to make assumptions about societal change. Empirical reference data reflect the extent of church adherence as well as the intensity of articulated components of faith and relevant practices. Noticeably, diminished societal relevance of institutionalized religion, conceived as “secularization”, and the alienation from traditional convictions as a consequence of increasing “individualization”, often combined with increased indifference towards church affiliation, mark the general trend. These components may be mutually reinforcing (Pollack 2003).

Such a view has a long tradition in German sociology of religion. One may recollect the thesis maintained by Georg Simmel and later by Hans Paul Bahrdt, that modern life is segmented into a public (institutionally regulated by secular authorities) and private (increasingly emancipated) sphere. According to José Casanova (2004), secularization and indivi-

dualization (increased subjectivity) coincide with the remainders of Christian cultural identity, thus providing the background for an emerging "civic religion".

The adoption of such a hypothetical pattern as a guideline for research and the interpretation of its results need to be critically reflected when applied to Eastern Europe. David Martin has posed the fundamental question whether there is an Eastern European pattern of secularization (2009). He refers to the historical divide between the three dominant denominations: Protestantism, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, which in his opinion are characterized by a graded proneness to secularization. Protestantism followed the path of modernity towards personal commitment and individual life-styles, while Catholicism, though more strongly characterized by communal devotion, is susceptible to individualization due to its rational exposition of dogma and its rationalized organization. At the opposite end, Orthodoxy is characterized by strong communal links, active popular devotion and ritual acts. "The world itself is not a neutral theatre or stage for purely human action, but impregnated with divine manifestations and malign infestations" (Martin 2009: 134). Martin hence infers that Orthodoxy is the least exposed to modernization and secularization.

As a second decisive factor affecting the trend towards secularization, Martin refers to the relative strength of the relation between religion and the national myth. The preservation of national identity, especially as part of a resistance against alien domination and tyranny, has played an important but varying role in the relationship between Church and State: "There is a scale of resistance to secularisation dependent on the role of the Church in relation to national identity and alien rule, negative in Czech Lands, in Estonia, and (for very complex reasons) in East Germany, ambiguous in Hungary, positive in Croatia, Slovakia, Serbia and maybe in Bulgaria, and very positive in Poland-Lithuania and Romania-Moldova"(Martin 2009: 141/142).

Under the influence of ratified or prospective membership in the EU and intensified cultural contacts with the "West", converging assimilation processes are likely but they remain probably path-dependent (culture-bound) in view of underlying different historical experiences. An elaborated analysis has been given by Detlef Pollack (2001).

The perception of religious phenomena is also conditioned by the application of research tools in different social milieus, or, as in the case of Eastern Europe, to different socio-cultural structures. Methodological problems arise in any case where subjective religiosity is measured along cognitive dimensions. But knowledge and faith are not the same. Knowledge procures cognition and faith provides emotional assurance. Emotional bonds and experiences often cannot be properly expressed orally. In such cases rational access is limited. This holds especially true for approaches which preconceive faith as a matter of personal decision, as is common in Protestantism. Only few behavioral patterns (religious feelings included) can be classified as decisions on the basis of alternatives.

Another haziness is immanent in some conceptions which differentiate between a secular "world" and the church as an essentially transcendental phenomenon. Taken absolutely, such a point of view would exclude any meaningful sociological analysis which is always based on evident interactions and their structural stabilization. But obviously sociological findings are relevant in order to comprehend social aspects of religious practices. This demonstrates that secularization as a process affecting institutionalized religion does not necessarily coincide with a loss of religiosity only because its manifestations no longer match patterns of thought maintained by church politicians.

Europeanisation, Multiple Modernities and Religion – The Reconstruction of Collective Identities in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe¹

Willfried Spohn

0. Introduction

A conspicuous characteristic of the post-communist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 has been the concurrent – though considerably differing – revival of nationalism and religion (Spohn 1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2008, 2009). There are several general reasons for this. The breakdown of communism was not only triggered by the pursuit of democracy and market capitalism but also by the quest for national sovereignty from communist imperial rule. The concomitant nationalism was often shaped by organic ethno-national rather than democratic-pluralist identities. The organic ethno-nationalism was frequently combined with a revitalisation of religion as a counter-move against the previous state-imposed secularism and repression of religion. Consequently, ethno-national and inter-religious tensions and conflicts often intensified.

In the framework of modernist and neo-modernist approaches that informed post-communist transitology and transformation research, the simultaneous revival of nationalism and religion was seldom foreseen (v. Beyme 1994; Bönker 2002; Müller/Pickel 2002; Dawisha/Parrot 1999; Linz/Stepan 1996; Outhwaite/Ray 2005). Rather, most scholars expected that secular-civic forms of nationalism would gradually emerge along with the political transition to democratic regimes, the socio-economic transformation to market capitalism and further secularisation. Even when the rise of ethno-nationalism was analysed, the religious sources and components were seldom addressed. Yet, in many instances, the emerging organic forms of ethno-nationalism were shaped by revitalising traditional forms of religiosity as well as new forms of religious fundamentalism and thus represented a key factor in the widespread ethno-religious mobilization, conflict and war.

In order to solve this theoretical dilemma between an evolutionist modernisation-*cum*-secularisation framework and the actual post-communist transformation processes, globalization approaches are appealing, as they criticize the methodological nationalism of modernisation theory and explain the revival of nationalism, religion and fundamentalism as a defence mechanism against intensifying global forces in the contemporary era (Beyer 1994, 2006; Juergensmeyer 2003). From this perspective, the impact of global capitalism on post-communist societies has led to sharp social disparities and inequalities that create favourable conditions for ethnic and religious defence reactions. However, conversely,

¹ This article was written as part of the research project "Europeanization, multiple modernities and collective identities – religion, nation and ethnicity in an enlarging Europe" (EUROMM), directed by Wolfgang Knöbl, Matthias Koenig and myself and thankfully funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, 2008-11.

internal factors within the society of the nation-state have been neglected. Hence, the reasons for the considerable variations in the ethnic and democratic as well as religious and secular components in the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe revival of nationalism remain unclear.

From my own multiple modernities perspective, both paradigms share a common bias as they reify or over-generalize either internal modernisation processes or external globalization pressures in a one-sided manner. Instead, I propose a historical-sociological perspective and suggest to consider the varying long-term processes: communist and pre-communist trajectories of state formation, nation-building and nationalism as well as religious development and secularisation patterns in the context of inter-civilisational constellations and global forces. Such a comparative historical-sociological perspective also helps, as I hope to demonstrate, to explain the considerable variations in the contemporary relations between nationalism and religion in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

In the following, I will first outline my multiple modernities perspective on Europe and Europeanization; second, I will analyse the relationships between state formation, nation-building, nationalism and religion in Central and Eastern Europe; third, I will concentrate on the relationships between religious development and secularisation as cultural bases of collective identities; and fourth and finally, I will consider the differing impacts of Europeanization on the post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe – independent of their membership in the European Union.

1. European Multiple Modernity, Religion and Collective Identities

The multiple modernities approach as developed by Shmuel Eisenstadt and his worldwide collaborators represents a specific revision of classical modernisation theory (Eisenstadt 2000, 2003, 2006). Like modernisation theory, the multiple modernities approach conceives of modernisation and modernity as a cluster of socio-cultural processes such as social differentiation and individualization, capitalist development, industrialization and social mobilization, state formation, nation-building and democratisation as well as rationalization and secularisation. However, in contrast to functionalist-evolutionary versions, the multiple modernities approach considers modernisation to be a contingent, conflictual and fragile developmental process dependent on individual and collective actions. Here, both structural processes of socio-economic change and tradition, culture and religion play a determining role; but, despite secularisation processes, religion in traditional, modernised or secular-religious forms remains a core dimension of modernity. Thus, there is a shift of emphasis from the structural, socio-economic and political-legal dimensions of modernisation to their interrelation with the cultural dimensions of modernisation and programs of modernity that are based on differing civilisational, axial and non-axial foundations.

And as a corollary, the worldly processes of modernisation do not simply reproduce the original model of European modernity but rather develop in multiple patterns in the context of differing civilisational dynamics and inter-civilisational constellations. As a consequence, the multiple modernities approach assumes that global modernity will not

The Modernisation of Gender Relations and Religion: Comparative Analysis of Secularization Processes

Kornelia Sammet and Daniel Bergelt

1. Introduction

In the course of social modernisation processes, religiosity and church attendance as well as denominational affiliation have – in Europe, at least – declined in many countries (see Müller 2009; Pickel 2009; Berger/Davie/Fokas 2008). This applies to a lesser extent for women: in empirical studies, they demonstrate almost universally higher values than men in terms of church affiliation and attendance, but also of subjective religiosity. These findings are often considered to be due to the fact that women are affected to a supposedly lesser degree by social modernisation. This would imply that integrating them more into modernisation processes would cause religiosity to decrease among women as well. Inglehart and Norris argue, for example, that “the transformation in women’s lives in modern societies during the twentieth century, generated by widening opportunities in education, the workforce, and public affairs and changes in families, the home, and modern lifestyles, has contributed to this dramatic decline in religiosity” (Inglehart/Norris 2005: 57).

Woodhead proposes directing attention to the significance of gender in processes of modernisation and secularization (2008: 192), because classical secularization theories are limited “by their lack of attention to gender difference” (Woodhead 2007: 578). They explore male experiences of industrial modernisation and the latter’s “sharp division of productive and reproductive labour between a feminised domestic sphere and a masculinised public sphere” (Woodhead 2007: 578; also Woodhead 2008). This division of spheres also has effects on religion: “Religion is therefore relocated. Although still under the ultimate control of a male father God and male ‘religious professionals’ (as they increasingly become), religion becomes women’s work, closely associated with the domestic sphere” (Woodhead 2007: 579). The often described “feminisation of Christianity” in the 19th century, with women successively entering public spaces in the churches and developing their own, female spirituality and piety, was a result of the division of spheres, with the relocation of religion and a complementary process to the male-dominated secularization (see Götz von Olenhusen 2000; McLeod 1988). A gender-attentive secularization theory has to be further differentiated. Woodhead suggests that the analysis of the relationship between gender and religion should be complemented by way of other categorisations, “advocating an approach to secularization which is attentive to power relations of all kinds – whether in relation to gender, or class, or ethnicity, or sexuality” (Woodhead 2008: 192).

In the following we aim to perform a differentiated analysis of the relationship between religion and modernisation, in which we will not use the aforementioned categorisations but instead expand upon other distinctions. On the one hand, in terms of the sociology of religion we will differentiate between believing and belonging (Davie 1994) as well as

atheism and religious indifference, as a position “beyond ambivalence and ambiguity towards religious subjects and church organisation” (Höhm/Krech 2006: 184, authors’ translation; see also Gärtner/Pollack/Wohlrab-Sahr 2003). On the other, various cultural contexts shall be included. We will do this in two steps: first, we will perform analyses comparing countries on the basis of quantitative data, in order to examine links between secularization processes and the modernisation of gender relations. The second step will consider the specific case of Eastern Germany, which is characterised by both highly advanced secularization and largely modernised gender relations. For this we will use material from a current qualitative study.

2. Cross-National Analyses: Religion and Gender in Modernisation Processes

When carrying out comparative analyses between countries to examine how the modernisation of gender relations is related to secularization, we are not looking so much at men’s and women’s religiosity and church affiliation per se. We are rather more interested in the degree of difference between the sexes as an indicator of the extent to which religion and the churches are social areas shaped by gender, and its relation to the level of attachment to traditional or modern gender norms in the respective countries.

2.1 *Comparing Gender Differences in Denominational Affiliation and Belief in God between European Countries*

Numerous quantitative studies have shown that virtually everywhere in the world women demonstrate higher levels of church affiliation and attendance to services as well as of religiosity (see for example Ingelhart/Norris 2005: 58; for Norway Furseth 2005; for United States of America Kosmin et al. 2009: 1). For Europe, transnational analyses have shown that women are more religious than men almost everywhere (apart from in the Netherlands) (Kecskes 2000: 99), and that this is true almost regardless of factors such as age, education and employment. These findings are often attributed to gender-specific religious socialisation (see for example Kecskes 2000). We suspect, however, that it is socially apportioned gender norms that are decisive here. We shall examine this proposition on the basis of data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), from the year 2008.¹ We will be restricting the analysis to 19 European countries defined by various denominational traditions, namely Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Given the enormous differences in religiosity and church affiliation found in Europe (see Pickel 2008, 2010; Pickel/Müller 2009), we will refrain from performing an additional, interreligious comparison.²

¹ We would like to thank Anja Gladkich for helping with the calculations. We also owe her and Gert Pickel our thanks for their remarks.

² As an exception, for contrast we include Turkey, as a country shaped by Sunni Islam and state-imposed laicism.

Religious Social Capital in Europe

Connections between Religiosity and Civil Society

Gert Pickel and Anja Gladkich

1. Religious Social Capital as a New Form of Organized Religiosity?

With Robert Putnam's "Making Democracy Work", first published in 1993, a lasting discussion concerning the effects of *social capital* on democracies' operational performance was set in motion.¹ Putnam defines social capital as associations formed on a voluntary bases, so-called social networks, as well as interpersonal or social trust and his central argument is that with citizens organizing into associations and social networks on a voluntary basis a form of (generalized) trust among people is generated. Putnam concludes that general confidence in democratic institutions and politics benefit from this trust generated. Over time, this *social trust*, in turn, cultivates trust in democratic institutions and political decisions. Additionally, it can be argued that social capital not only contributes significantly to the creation of social integration or eases the implementation of political goals in society, but is also one of the main foundations for the development of *civil societies*. Consequently, the cultivation of social capital, on either level (networks or social trust), constitutes an important resource for successful democratization.²

In 2000, Putnam elaborated on his analysis of the concept of social capital in his book with the intentionally provocative title "Bowling Alone" (2000), using the example of the United States. Putnam concluded on a rather pessimistic note that in regard to the development of social capital in modern (Western) societies a high degree of pluralization, individualization and medialization is present. While a progressing *individualization* in modern societies causes citizens to increasingly withdraw from the public as well as the above-mentioned networks, it is the augmented societal *pluralization* that destroys social structures. Last but not least, increasing medialization, especially the augmented role of TV and internet for the leisure and recreation industry renders many associations redundant. Increasingly, people are required to depend on themselves, resulting in social networks eroding, as are the opportunities to develop social trust.

Recently, with some delay, the social sciences have begun to study the *relation between religion and social capital* (Campbell/Putnam 2010; Smidt 2003; Roßteutscher 2009; Traunmüller 2009; Traunmüller/Freitag 2011). A comprehensible and obvious trend, for church networks and membership in religious associations create social trust and therefore ultimately social capital for society in general. After all, it was religion's *integrative power*

¹ The importance of social capital for society has also been discussed elsewhere, perhaps most prominently by James Coleman (1990) and Pierre Bourdieu (1982). For this article, they will not be taken into account since both propose a different definition of social capital as compared to Putnam and also approach the subject from a different perspective.

² For this very reason, social networks are also sometimes referred to as "schools of democracy". The people are able to learn civic virtues, which on the long run help the democracy to survive.

that formed quite frequently the center of sociolinguistic discussions ever since sociology emerged as a discipline (Durkheim 2005 [Orig. 1922]; Parsons 1937; Bellah 1967). Since de Tocqueville (1976 [Orig. 1840]), potential relevance of religion in terms of solidarity within a political society has firmly established itself in political scientific debates. Thus, Putnam's take on religion and its effects on communalization processes as one of the main sources of "social putty" in society is neither novel nor unrelated to traditional sociological theories (Putnam 2000: 65-79).

What actually *is* remarkable, however, is the fact that it was not until recently that contemporary debates explicitly emphasized *religious or faith-based social capital* at all, especially when this emphasis was mostly only sporadic. Most likely, due to the fact that debates on the *processes of secularization* in modern societies have predominated since the beginning of the 20th century, religion and religious networks have played a marginal role in the analyses of social capital (which emerged in the 1990s) outside the United States. Researchers in the field of the European sociology of religion considered the decline in citizens' commitment to (Christian) religions as a given in the Western World (Berger 1967; Wilson 1982). Due to this *loss of social relevance of religion* and its concomitant processes of functional differentiation, privatization and detraditionalization, or so the assumption goes, it is no longer necessary to inquire about the effects of religious communalization on social integration in modern civil societies.

Recently, authors have increasingly proclaimed a *return* of religions (Huntington 1996; Riesebrodt 2001), of the Gods (Graf 2004) or the religious in general. Apparently, religion remains important in modern societies. Even if the empirical evidence supporting the assertion of the return of religion is not very extensive, it has been acknowledged that *secularization (the process)* is not to be equated with *secularity (the state)*. It may be worthwhile to focus once again on processes of religious communalization and religious socialization as well as the relationship between the church and the state and its effects on social occurrences of the religious.

These contradictory religious sociological interpretations of the present situation provide a good reason to study the correlations between social capital and religiosity *empirically*, as this may also stimulate the discussion on the relationship between religion and politics. At the same time, the analysis will lead the sociology of religion, with its strong emphasis on individualized religiosity (Luckmann 1967; see also Roy 2010), back to considering the relevance of religious social groups. It should be contemplated whether *religious social capital* in modern societies is actually empirically relevant for the development of civil society (1). Its effects may be *social* in the sense of integrating the members of society³, but it may also be *political* in the sense of serving as "schools of democracy" as Putnam calls it. Therefore, it is necessary to study the *kinds of effects* of religious social capital on civil society (2). It may serve as a mediator between social groups – i.e. it builds bridges (*bridging*) – or it may reinforce and integrate exclusive social groups (*bonding*) – which may, however, cause them to systematically distinguish between themselves and other social groups. It should also be of interest which impact the current religious trends have on the social capital in European civil societies (3). Will (additional) waves of secularization demolish civil societies or are they negligible as secular networks replace social networks?

³ This aspect refers to the classic sociological debate on the cohesion of the social order in individualizing societies (Durkheim 2005; Parsons 1937).